In all the excitement over the December 21 LTRO, Europe forgot one small thing: since it is the functional equivalent of banks using the Discount Window (and at 3 years at that, not overnight), it implies that a recipient bank is in a near-death condition. As such, the incentive for good banks to dump on bad ones is huge, which means that everyone must agree to be stigmatized equally, or else a split occurs whereby the market praises the "good banks" and punishes the "bad ones" (think Lehman). As a reminder, this is what Hank Paulson did back in 2008 when he forced all recently converted Bank Holding Companies to accept bail outs, whether they needed them or not, something that Jamie Dimon takes every opportunity to remind us of nowadays saying he never needed the money but that it was shoved down his throat. Be that as it may, the reason why there has been no borrowings on the Fed's discount window in years, in addition to the $1.6 trillion in excess fungible reserves floating in the system, is that banks know that even the faintest hint they are resorting to Fed largesse is equivalent to signing one's death sentence, and in many ways is the reason why the Fed keeps pumping cash into the system via QE instead of overnight borrowings. Yet what happened in Europe, when a few hundred banks borrowed just shy of €500 billion is in no way different than a mass bailout via a discount window. Still, over the past month, Europe which was on the edge equally and ratably, and in which every bank was known to be insolvent, has managed to stage a modest recovery, and now we are back to that most precarious of states - where there is explicit stigma associated with bailout fund usage. And unfortunately, it could not have come at a worse time for the struggling continent: with a new "firewall" LTRO on deck in three weeks, one which may be trillions of euros in size, ostensibly merely to shore up bank capital ahead of a Greek default, suddenly the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent is back with a vengeance, as the precarious Nash equilibrium of the past month collapses, and suddenly a two-tier banking system forms - the banks which the market will not short, and those which it will go after with a vengeance.
The WSJ has more on this very subtle but so very critical shift in the European bailout game theory equilibrium:
A group of top European banks is disclosing that they didn't borrow money under the European Central Bank's bank-lending program, fearful of being perceived as bailout recipients.
The broad participation in the program, known as the Long-Term Refinancing Operation, fueled a sense of euphoria among many bank executives and investors that the worst of the Continent's two-year banking crisis was over. In a second batch of loans in late February, analysts expect the ECB to distribute as much as €1 trillion in additional funds, partly because the central bank is making it easier for banks to borrow.
But some bankers and observers are starting to warn about unexpected fallout from the ECB's loan program. A top concern among banks is that the receipt of central-bank lifelines could subject them to potential political or regulatory interference and sully their ability to declare themselves free of any outside help. That sentiment has the potential to damp demand for future ECB loans, at least among the Continent's strongest banks.
In other words, the market is finally waking up that the LTRO, more than merely carrying the upside of a mechanism preserving the status quo for a brief period of time, also has the downside of implicit stigma associated with any and every bank that is found to use it. And the punchline here is that the second a European "Jamie Dimon" emerges and starts touting their lack of need to use LTRO cash, the whole plan collapses. It appears that Deutsche Bank, the bank whose assets are 80% of German GDP, is just that equilibrium collapse factor.
It isn't yet clear how many banks declined to borrow but the list includes Deutsche Bank AG and Barclays PLC. While the ECB doesn't divulge which banks borrowed, most companies are expected to disclose the information as they release annual results this month.
"The fact that we have never taken any money from the government has made us, from a reputation point of view, so attractive with so many clients in the world that we would be very reluctant to give that up," said Josef Ackermann, Deutsche Bank's chief executive, explaining to analysts last week why the German lender didn't borrow from the ECB.
Mr. Ackermann said Deutsche Bank still is scarred from its experience borrowing from the Federal Reserve in the first phase of the financial crisis in 2008. U.S. regulators encouraged banks to borrow under the cloak of promised confidentiality, but when the banks' identities were subsequently disclosed by the Fed, the recipients were dubbed bailout recipients. "We learned a lesson," Mr. Ackermann said.
Other bank executives privately have voiced similar opinions. Some of that sentiment is likely to surface publicly in coming weeks as banks report annual results and executives face questions from investors about whether they borrowed from the ECB.
English banks are also suddenly scrambling to portray themselves as healthy:
In the U.K., the Financial Services Authority informally encouraged the banks to tap the ECB loan program, although the regulator also made clear that the decision was up to the individual banks, according to executives with several British banks. The goal of the FSA, shared by other European regulators, was to promote broad use of the facility and reduce any stigma associated with borrowing, said people familiar with the matter.
A number of top British banks, including Barclays, Standard Chartered PLC and Lloyds Banking Group PLC, opted not to borrow from the ECB, according to people familiar with the matter.
Beyond the implicit, there are explicit risks associated with being bailed out:
"Those heavily reliant on ECB funding run risks of interference as a price for continued support. This may come to be seen as a form of nationalization," said Simon Samuels, a European banking analyst at Barclays Capital. He said bank executives are likely to worry that regulators will view their dependence on ECB funds as a sign of a broken business model and will pressure them to restructure operations.
Such concerns are peripheral for banks that potentially were going to have trouble refinancing maturing debt at nonpunitive prices. Virtually every major French, Spanish and Italian bank borrowed billions of euros from the ECB, according to bank disclosures and people familiar with the matter. Among those was Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, Spain's second-largest lender by assets, which borrowed €11 billion, the bank's president told analysts last week.
Some healthy banks also pounced on the opportunity for inexpensive three-year funding. HSBC Holdings PLC was among those that borrowed even though it didn't need the money, according to people familiar with the matter. Any profits the British bank reaps from investing the borrowed funds will be segregated from HSBC's bonus pool, one person said.
Yet all these considerations pale before the reality that any banks that borrows even €1 on February 29 will suddenly be perceived as a lower-tier performer, when faced with banks that parade with their "fortress balance sheet." And as everyone knows, bail outs only work when everyone agrees to be bailed out. Otherwise, it is a shortcut to collapse. Because the last thing Intesa and UniCredit and STD and a whole lot of not so healthy banks will want on March 1 and onward is to be put in the "bailout recipient" category when so many others clearly no longer need the cash...
It appears that European banks, in their vain attempts for short-term capital gains, may have just sealed the fate of the entire financial sector.